AUG 0 9-2001

Clerk

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SHARON SMITH,

Defendents.

VS.

MARJORIE KNOLLER, et al.

Plaintiff,

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CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT, UNLIMITED JURISDICTION CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW AND MOTION DEPARTMENT

ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

No. 319532

Defendants' (KNOLLER and NOEL) Demurrer to and Motion to Strike Amended Complaint came on for hearing on July 27, 2001, before the Honorable A. James Robertson II. Upon considering the moving, opposing, and amici curiae papers, and the arguments raised at the hearing, the court OVERRULES the Demurrer and DENIES the Motion to Strike.

Cal. Code of Civil Procedure sec. 377.60 ("the wrongful death statute") provides that a "surviving spouse" may bring a cause of action for wrongful death. Platfittiff contends that the term "spouse" applies to same-sex couples or at the very least, the word is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner which effectuates the underlying purposes of the wrongfuldeath statute. The court rejects plaintiff's argument as inconsistent with the plain meaning of

ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE

the word "spouse." See Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., 1969 (defining "spouse" as "[a] husband or wife"); Cal. Family Code sec. 301 and 308.5; Elden v. Sheldon, (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267; Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 464 (unmarried heterosexual cohabitants are not "spouses" under the wrongful death statute). Plaintiff also asserts that reading the wrongful death statute to exclude her claim denies her equal protection based upon her sexual orientation in violation of Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 7. The court agrees.

This court has the responsibility to construe the legislation in such a manner as to save its constitutionality. An interpretation of the wrongful death statute which would exclude such persons as plaintiff would require the court to strike down the statute as a denial of equal protection of the law; whereas to include her within the term "surviving spouse" would not, and neither would it be contrary to legislative intent nor policy. See Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Comm. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 632-637; Hayes v. Superior Court. (1971) 6 Cal.3d 216, 224 ("In light of the purposes and history of a particular statute or an overall statutory scheme a reviewing court may correct a discriminatory classification by invalidating the invidious exemption and thus extending statutory benefits to those whom the Legislature unconstitutionally excluded.").

Under the California Constitution, hornosexuals are entitled to equal protection of the laws. See Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458; Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1025. "It is well established that equal protection of the laws requires only that persons similarly situated receive like treatment..." Nieto, 138 Cal.App.3d at 469. A statute, which appears facially valid, may have a discriminatory effect in its application thereby denying equal protection of the law. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1885) 118 U.S. 356, 373. In addition, courts have not

Because the court concludes that interpreting the wrongful death statute to exclude homosexnals violates the rational basis test, the court need not decide whether to employ "strict scrutiny," "heightened scrutiny," or "the exacting rational basis test." It is noteworthy, however, that rights guaranteed by the California Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution, see Cal. Const., art. I, see. 24 and Cay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 469. Moreover, "the courts of this state traditionally extend strict scrutiny to a broader range of classifications than are so rigorously reviewed under identical provisions of the federal constitution." King v. McMahon, (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 648, 656.

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hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its side. See Brown v. Board of Education, (1954) 347 U.S. 483; Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, (1966) 383 U.S. 663.

In Levy v. Lousiana, (1968) 391 U.S. 68, the United States Supreme Court held that a Louisiana statute which denied illegitimate as distinguished from legitimate children the right to sue for the wrongful death of a natural mother created an unlawful classification. Justice Douglas explained that "[w]hen the child's claim of damage for lose of his mother is in issue, why, in terms of 'equal protection,' should the tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate?" Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. In Labine v. Vincent. (1971) 401 U.S. 532, the court addressed a Louisiana statute which barred an illegitimate child, who had nevertheless been acknowledged, from sharing equally with legitimate issue in the father's estate. The high court held that there was no equal protection violation and distinguished Levy. The Labine court observed that the statute in Levy created "an insurmountable barrier" to the illegitimate child's participation while the illegitimate child in Labine encountered no such barrier (she could have inherited through a will or other means). Labine, 401 U.S. at 539. In Steed v. Imperial Airlines, (1974) 12 Cal.3d 115, the California Supreme Court held that the deceased's stepchild, who deceased never adopted, could not recover under the wrongful death statute as an "heir." The court noted that since the deceased could have adopted the plaintiff "the Levy-Labine 'insurmountable barrier' test of constitutional denial is thus satisfied." Steed, 12 Cal.3d at 125.

In this case, when one reads the wrongful death statute in conjunction with Cal. Family Code sec. 308.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."), there exists an insurmountable barrier to the right of a homosexual to bring an action for the wrongful death of his or her partner. This barrier is not reasonably related to any legitimate public purpose.

"The purpose behind the wrongful death statute is to provide compensation for the loss of companionship and other losses resulting from decedent's death." Marks v. Lyerla.

(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 556. Here, plaintiff's sexuality has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted upon her and denying recovery would be a windfall for the tortfeasor. The Legislature reasonably could confine wrongful death recovery to a surviving spouse to encourage marriage. See Elden, 46 Cal.3d at 274-275; Nieto. 138 Cal.App.3d at 472. However, precluding same sex partners from recovery under the wrongful death statute does not further the state's interest in promoting marriage because Cal. Family Code sec, 308.5 expressly forbids same sex marriages. Obviously, allowing plaintiff a cause of action will impose a burden on the court and intrude into plaintiff's private life. The court will need to inquire into the character of her relationship to determine whether it is sufficiently similar to the relationship between a husband and wife. Nevertheless, courts (as opposed to insurers and administrative agencies) are uniquely situated to make such a determination. Indeed, other sections of the wrongful death statute require a thorough factual analysis. See Cal. Code of Civil Procedure sec. 377.60(b). Most importantly, administrative case cannot "be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." Gomez v. Perez, (1973) 409 U.S. 535, 538.

To ascertain whether plaintiff can in fact recover under the wrongful death statute, the court must make a factually intensive analysis. Such an analysis is not suitable for resolution on demurrer. Some of the factors which the court should weigh include whether the plaintiff and decedent are registered domestic partners under Cal. Family code sec. 297 or if not registered, their relationship otherwise meets the standards set forth in that statute. For example, the court should examine whether a common residence exists, the degree of economic cooperation, fidelity, and the stability and duration of the relationship. While such an inquiry is intrusive, it is plaintiff's decision to bring the action. It would be untenable to deny plaintiff's claim merely because the court may need to examine her private life.

In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 516, the court held that denying state dental insurance coverage to a cohabitant in a homosexual relationship did not offend the equal protection clause of the state Constitution. That case is

distinguishable, however. First, the cohabitant in <u>Hinman</u> could still obtain dental insurance. In the instant action, there exists an *insurmountable barrier* to plaintiff's recovery. Second, <u>Hinman</u> implicated different policy considerations, including the state coffers and a public service. Here, if the court bars plaintiff's suit, then individual tortfeasors may obtain a windfall. Third, the right to petition the court to recover for the loss of a loved one because of the misfeasance of another implicates a right and a loss far distinct from the ability to receive dental coverage.

Reading the wrongful death statute to exclude plaintiff would unduly punish her for her sexual orientation. Such a reading has no place in our system of government, which has as one of its basic tenets equal protection for all.

Defendants have thirty (30) days from the date of execution of this order to answer.

Dated: dugust 92001

The Honorable 2. James Robertson I Judge of the Suberior Court

California Superior Court

City and County of San Francisco

Law & Motion Department • Room 302

SHARON SMITH,	No. 319532
Plaintiff,	Certificate of Service by Mail
vs.	(CCP § 1013a(4))
MARJORIE KNOLLER, et al.,	
Defendants.	
	J
I, Gordon Park-Li, Clerk of the Su	perior Court of the City and County of San
Francisco, certify that:	the state of the s
1) I am not a party to the within action; 2) On AUG 0 9 200;	
2) On AUG U 9 2001	, I served the attached:
ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER	R AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE
by placing a copy thereof in a seal	ed envelope, addressed to the following:
Michael Cardoza, Esq.	Shannon Minter, Esq.
700 Montgomery St.	National Center for Lesbian Rights
San Francisco, CA 94111	870 Market St., Suite 570
	San Francisco, CA 94102
Robert Nosi	Marjorie Knoeller
125 7 th St.	the anth as
, pa	425 7 th St.
San Francisco, CA 94086	425 7" St. San Francisco, CA 94086
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San Francisco, CA 94086 and, 3) I then placed the sealed envelope in	San Francisco, CA 94086 1 the outgoing mail at 400 McAllister St., San
San Francisco, CA 94086 and, 3) I then placed the sealed envelope in Francisco, CA 94102 on the date indicated	San Francisco, CA 94086 the outgoing mail at 400 McAllister St., San above for collection, attachment of required
San Francisco, CA 94086 and, 3) I then placed the sealed envelope in rancisco, CA 94102 on the date indicated repaid postage, and mailing on that date follows:	San Francisco, CA 94086 the outgoing mail at 400 McAllister St., San above for collection, attachment of required owing standard court practice.
San Francisco, CA 94086 and, 3) I then placed the sealed envelope in Francisco, CA 94102 on the date indicated	San Francisco, CA 94086 the outgoing mail at 400 McAllister St., San above for collection, attachment of required